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Abstract—In wireless ad-hoc sensor networks, an important
issue often faced in geographic greedy forwarding routing is the
“local minimum phenomenon” which is caused by deployment
holes and blocks the forwarding process. In this paper, we provide
a new information model for the geographic greedy forwarding
routing that only forwards the packet within the so-called request
zone. Under this new information model, the hole and its affected
area are identified easily and quickly in an unsafe area with a
labeling process. The greedy forwarding will be blocked if and
only if a node inside the unsafe area is used. Due to the shape of
the request zone, an unsafe area can be estimated as a rectangular
region in the local view of unsafe nodes. With such estimate
information, the new routing method proposed in this paper
will avoid blocking by holes and achieve better performance in
routing time while the cost of information construction is greatly
reduced compared with the best results known to date.
Keywords: Distributed algorithm, information model, routing,
wireless ad-hoc sensor networks.

I. I NTRODUCTION
Geographic greedy forwarding [1], [2], as a simple, efficient
and scalable strategy, is the most promising routing scheme in
wireless ad-hoc sensor networks (WASNs). In such a scheme,
the routing path from the source to the destination is determined by the forwarding node selection at each intermediate
node in a fully-distributed manner. The packet is forwarded
hop by hop along such a path. An important challenge often
faced in geographic greedy forwarding in WASNs is the “local
minimum phenomenon” [3] which is caused by deployment
holes where the forwarding process is blocked at a node
called stuck node. The occurrence of hole can be caused by
many factors, such as sparse deployment, physical obstacles,
node failures, communication jamming, power exhaustion, and
animus interference [3]–[7].
To mitigate the local minimum issue, Greedy-Face-Greedy
(GFG) [8], Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing (GPSR) [9],
and Greedy-Other-Adaptive-Face Routing (GOAFR) [10] are
currently the most popular methods. When routing process
gets stuck at an intermediate node, it will start a perimeter
routing phase where the packet is routed by the “right-hand
rule” counter-clockwise along a face of the planar graph that
represents the same connectivity as the original network, until
it reaches a node that is closer to the destination than that stuck
node. After that, the routing returns to the greedy forwarding

phase. In recent work [11]–[13], such a routing scheme is
proved to guarantee delivery in any arbitrary planar graph.
However, without enough shape information of the holes, such
a routing may use a long detour path in the perimeter routing,
compared with the shortest path to the destination [14].
In this paper, we propose a simple and efficient method to
achieve a much shorter path than any traditional one in the
geographic greedy forwarding routing. Inspired by an early
work of safety level [15] and its extensions [16], we develop
an information model to identify the affected area of each hole
as an unsafe area. Many nodes near the stuck nodes are also
affected because their successors are all stuck nodes. Thus,
all such nodes, including both the stuck nodes and some of
their neighboring nodes, are unsafe. By limiting the greedy
forwarding within the request zone in [2], the shape of each
unsafe area can be estimated as a rectangular region, which
has a simple structure for easy construction and maintenance.
Moreover, by considering the relative locations of the source
and the destination, such an unsafe area is optimal; that
is, the local minimum will occur if and only if an unsafe
node is used in routing. In order to make the whole system
scalable, such an information model is implemented in a
fully distributed manner. With the estimated shape information
collected and distributed only among a few unsafe neighbors,
the corresponding routing can avoid the local minimum by
always selecting safe node in forwarding phase. As a result,
the routing performance will improve greatly while the cost
of information model can be controlled to minimal.
The contributions of this paper are threefold.
• First, we provide a novel information model in which the
forwarding hole and its affected nodes can be identified in
an unsafe area and further be estimated as a rectangle. It
is the first attempt to address the mutual impact of holes
in blocking the routing. It is proved that such regions are
optimal and their construction converges very quickly.
• Second, our new information model is applied to the routing. This is the first attempt to find the balance of tradeoff
between the cost of information model and the routing
adaptivity while pursuing better routing performance. The
new information-based routing, denoted as SLGF, has the
ability of precisely predicting the local minimum ahead,
which distinguishes itself from the others.

Third, we develop a simulator to show the substantial
improvement of SLGF routing in term of the routing time
and the cost of hole information model, compared with
the best results known to date. The experimental results
show that a cost-effective geographic greedy forwarding
routing is created under our new information model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces some necessary notations and preliminaries.
Section 3 provides our new hole information model and its
distributed construction process, including information collection, distribution, and storage. Some analytical results on
the cost of this model are also provided. In Section 4, we
introduce the SLGF routing. In Section 5, the experimental
results are provided to show the performance improvement and
the cost reduction in SLGF routing, compared with the best
results known to date. Section 6 provides some background
information and Section 7 concludes the paper and provides
directions for future research.

Y

•

II. P RELIMINARY
With the assumption that all the sensors have the same
communication range, a WASN can be represented by a
simple undirected graph G = (V, E), where V is a set of
vertices including all the nodes and E is a set of undirected
edges, each of which indicates two nodes are within the
communication range of each other. N (u) denotes the set of
neighboring nodes of node u. Each node u has the location
(xu , yu ), simply denoted by L(u). The location information
can be discovered by having Global Positioning System (GPS)
receivers [17] at some fixed nodes [18], or a mobile beacon
node [19], or just relying on the relative coordinate system
[20]. | L(u) − L(v) | is the distance between two nodes u and
v. s(xs , ys ) and d(xd , yd ) are the source and the destination
nodes. [x1 : x2 , y1 : y2 ] represents a rectangle with four
corners (x1 , y1 ), (x1 , y2 ), (x2 , y2 ), and (x2 , y1 ). In this paper,
all the routing schemes are presented via their forwarding
node selection at an intermediate node u(xu , yu ) along the
path. Rectangle [xu : xd , yu : yd ] has both u and d at the
opposite corners. It is also called the request zone of node u
and denoted as Z(u). When d is located in quadrant I (or the
Northeast) of u, the routing is called type-I routing and the
corresponding Z(u) in quadrant I of u is called a type-I request
zone (see in Figure 1 (a)). Similarly, we have type-II, III, and
IV routings and their request zones (where Z(u) locates in
quadrants II, III, and IV of u, respectively), after a 90, 180, or
270 degree counter-clockwise rotation of the graph G. Note
that the forwarding for one packet may experience different
types of request zones, when the relative position of d to u
changes and d locates in different types of request zones (see
in Figure 1 (b)). To increase the readability of this paper, we
only focus on the discussion on type-I (i.e., Northeast type).
To simplify the discussion, we describe all the schemes in a
synchronous, round-based system. All the schemes presented
in this paper can be extended easily to an asynchronous round
based system. However, to make our schemes clear, we do not
pursue the relaxation.
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Definition of different types of request zones.

In [21], the stuck node is identified where the packet can
get the local minimum in greedy forwarding routing [8], [9],
and then, a process called BOUNDHOLE is initiated to form
a closed circle (also called a boundary). The region enclosed
by the boundary is identified as the hole area. For each node
u along the boundary, its successor node along the boundary
in clockwise order is marked as the downstream node of u.
When the local minimum occurs, the routing must be at a
stuck node u which is also a boundary node. The boundaryinformation-based routing in [21] will then route the packet
downstream until it reaches a node v whose distance to d is
closer than that of u. After that, the greedy forwarding phase
can continue with the routing decision described in the LAR
scheme 2 in [2]. The complete routing algorithm (also called
GF routing) is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Geographic greedy forwarding (GF) routing
based on boundary information [21]
At the current node u (including the source s):
1: If d ∈ N (u), forward the packet to d, and then stop.
2: Use the greedy forwarding to forward the packet to v ∈
N (u) where | L(v) − L(d) |<| L(u) − L(d) | [2].
3: If such a v does not exist, u is on the boundary. Repeat the
perimeter routing to send the packet along the downstream
until a node v, which satisfies the condition | L(v) −
L(d) |<| L(u) − L(d) |, is reached.
As one of many traditional geographic greedy routings using
“right-hand rule” policy [8]–[13] in the perimeter routing
phase, the limited geographic greedy routing, denoted by
LGF, selects the forwarding successor candidates within the
request zone which is described in LAR scheme 1 in [2] as a
rectangle in the corresponding quadrant. The successor node
selection at the current node u in its perimeter routing phase is
implemented by simply rotating the ray ud counter-clockwise
until the first untried node v ∈ N (u) is hit by the ray. The
details of the LGF are shown in Algorithm 2.
Figure 2 (a) shows an example of LGF routing. First,
the type-I greedy forwarding starts and the packet will be
forwarded to node u5 . At node u5 , the routing cannot find
the successor in the request zone Z(u5 ) so that the perimeter
routing phase is conducted and the packet is forwarded to u2 .

u6
d
u4

d
u4

hole
u3

u2
detour

forwarding

hole
u3

u5

forwarding

u1

s
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detour
u1
s
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Fig. 2. (a) LGF routing (i.e., forwarding with LAR scheme 1). (b) GF routing
[21] (i.e., forwarding with LAR scheme 2).

Algorithm 2 Limited geographic greedy forwarding (LGF)
routing
At the current node u (including the source s):
1: If d ∈ N (u), forward the packet to d, and then stop.
2: Determine the request zone Z(u) = [xu : xd , yu : yd ]
and use the greedy forwarding to forward the packet to
v ∈ (N (u) ∩ Z(u)) [2].
3: If such a v does not exist, send the packet in the perimeter
routing by the “right-hand rule” policy [8]–[13].

When the routing reaches node u6 , the request zone is of type
IV. Starting from u6 , the packet will be forwarded in type-IV
greedy forwarding until it reaches the destination d.
Compared with GF routing in [21], the forwarding in LGF
routing is more straightforward. Without the effect of holes,
LGF routing will achieve a shorter path. However, it has fewer
number of different paths (see the only selection of u5 at u1 in
Figure 2 (a)). Thus, if there is a hole ahead, LGF routing has
fewer opportunities to continue the greedy forwarding phase
and may experience more perimeter routing phases (compare
the routing in Figure 2 (b)). As a result, it may have a longer
routing path than GF routing in the presence of holes.
In the next section, we will present our hole information
model for LGF routing. The information-based LGF routing
can achieve better performance than GF routing in terms of
the length of routing path (i.e., the speed of routing). In this
way, we show the impact value of our new information model.

zone; that is, the local minimum occurs. In our new information model, the nodes are labeled as unsafe nodes if using
them and only using them will cause a local minimum. Due
to the types of request zones, there are four different types of
safe/unsafe statuses. Type-I safe/unsafe status is identified for
type-I routing using type-I request zone. Respectively, we have
safe/unsafe statuses of type-II, III, and IV. The definition of
safe/unsafe status of each type and the corresponding labeling
processes are shown as follows. After the labeling process,
each node will be labeled with a 4-tuple (N E, N W, SW, SE)
where N E stands for the safe/unsafe status of type-I. N W ,
SW , and SE are the ones of type-II, III, and IV, respectively.
Definition 1 (labeling process): Initially, each healthy node
u(xu , yu ) sets its status 4-tuple (N E, N W, SW, SE) to (s,
s, s, s), where symbol “s” (or “u”) stands for the safe
(or unsafe) status and N E, N W , SW , and SE are the
safe/unsafe statuses of type-I, II, III, and IV, respectively.
Any status, say N E, will be changed to unsafe if there is
no type-I safe neighbor in the type-I request zone; that is,
{v(xv , yv ) | v ∈ N (u) ∧ v has label (s, −, −, −) ∧
xu < xv ∧ yu < yv } = ∅, where symbol “−” stands for
either safe or unsafe status.
Based on Definition 1, a node u may change its safe status
of one type, say type-I, to unsafe status; that is, a hole in
the type-I request zone is detected. This change may also
affect its neighbors’ safety information and contribute further
changes. The hole and all nearby connected type-I unsafe
nodes form a so-called type-I unsafe area. According to the
type of unsafe nodes contained, other types of unsafe areas,
type-II, III, and IV unsafe areas, form respectively. We assume
that all of the communication actions occur inside a region
that is called the interest area. In our labeling process, any
node out of the interest area will always keep its status tuple
as (s, s, s, s). Moreover, a node inside the interest area will
always keep one certain safe status, for instance, N E, when its
communication disk in the corresponding quadrant intersects
the edge of interest area. Thus, the edge of interest area will
not affect the label of nodes inside. The following theorem
shows that the unsafe area is optimal for a LGF routing.

III. S AFETY M ODEL FOR LGF ROUTING

Theorem 1: For any hole that can block an LGF routing with
certain type, say type-I, using and only using a type-I unsafe
node in the corresponding unsafe area will definitely cause
the local minimum.

In this section, we introduce the concept of safe/unsafe
status. The hole and its nearby connected unsafe nodes will
form an unsafe area. Then, we prove that such an unsafe
area is optimal for LGF routing. In the local view of each
unsafe node, the unsafe area is estimated as a rectangular
region. We provide a distributed construction process to collect
and distribute the safety information and the estimated shape
information in the entire network.
In LGF routing, the perimeter routing phase starts when the
current node u has no successor candidate inside its request

Proof: For the last hole that can block a type-I LGF forwarding, s is in its Southwest and d is in its Northeast.
Moreover, d cannot be an unsafe node in its unsafe area.
Obviously, when such a local minimum occurs, the LGF
routing has reached a type-I unsafe node along the perimeter
of the hole. On the other hand, if a greedy forwarding path
u → u1 → u2 → · · · → ui = d exists, we can find an
unsafe node uj that its successor uj+1 is safe. According to
the definition of unsafe status of uj , uj+1 cannot be in its
type-I request zone and cannot be the successor of uj .
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Fig. 3.
Labeling process for type-I unsafe nodes. (a) stabilized safety
information, (b) GF (u) & E(u), and (c) E(u) with mutual impact of holes.

A sample of the labeling process is shown in Figure 3 (a).
Initially, all nodes will set their status 4-tuple as (s, s, s, s).
Only those nodes within the interest area will change their
safety statuses. In the first round, nodes u1 and u2 will change
its N E status to unsafe. In the second round, this unsafe status
change will cause the change of the N E status at node u3 .
The N E status of nodes u1 , u2 , and u3 indicates a hole area
in the direction of Northeast. It is noted that u4 will keep its
safe statuses because its communication disk in each quadrant
intersects the edge of interest area.
Assume node u is a type-I unsafe node. The part of the
type-I unsafe area in quadrant I describes the effect of the
hole that blocks the forwarding of type-I routing from node u
in the Northeast direction. We introduce the concept of greedy
forwarding region of type-I unsafe node u, GFN E (u). Such
a region includes all the unsafe nodes that can be reached
from u by forwarding in the Northeast direction. Respectively,
we have GFN W (u), GFSW (u), and GFSE (u) to indicate the
greedy forwarding regions, which include the unsafe nodes in
type-II, III, and IV unsafe areas reached by greedy forwarding
in the corresponding direction. To simplify the discussion, we
can only focus on GFN E (u), simply denoted by GF (u).
For any node v ∈ GF (u), we can always find a path v0 (=
u), v1 , v2 , · · · , vn (= v), such that vi (0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1) is
unsafe and vi+1 is inside the type-I request zone of vi . A
sample of GF (u) is shown in Figure 3 (b). Rotate a ray from
u scanning GF (u), counter-clockwisely. We denote that u(1)
and u(2) are the farthest nodes that can be reached on the first
and the last greedy forwarding paths. When the forwarding in
type-I routing reaches node u, u(1) or u(2) can be used as the
bound to detour around the hole. In this way, a short detour
path is guaranteed and many unnecessary detours inside the
unsafe area can be avoided. Therefore, from the view of node
u, the shape of unsafe area H can be estimated as H ∪ [xu :
xu(1) , yu : yu(2) ]. Furthermore, for a type-I forwarding routing,
the shape of unsafe area can simply be represented by E(u):
[xu : xu(1) , yu : yu(2) ].
Individually, each unsafe node u will have its own estimated
shape information of the related unsafe area. To collect and
distribute such information, we have the following implementation. When u has no neighbor in the request zone, according
to the definition, u(1) = u(2) = u. For the rest of cases, the
location information of u(1) and u(2) is collected as well as

the propagation of unsafe status. It is because that each node
w along that greedy forwarding path from u to u(1) will have
w(1) = u(1) . Node u can collect the location information of
u(1) from its neighbor along that path, i.e., the first type-I
unsafe neighbor hit by a ray from u when scanning the type-I
requst region in counter-clockwise order. Similarly, we have a
path from u to u(2) for the update of u(2) at u.
Figure 3 (b) shows the forwarding region of the type-I
unsafe node u and the corresponding farthest reachable nodes
u(1) and u(2) . Then, the shape of the hole area in the Northeast
is estimated as E(u): [xu : xu(1) , yu : yu(2) ]. Figure 3 (c)
shows the sample of E(u) in the case when u is mutually
affected by intertwined holes. In the following theorem, we
show that the convex rectangle E(u) is equivalent to the unsafe
area H for the routing at node u.
Theorem 2: The greedy forwarding from node u in LGF routing, say type-I, will be blocked iff any node inside the estimated
unsafe area of an unsafe node u, E(u) [xu : xu(1) , yu : yu(2) ],
is used.
Proof: Any type-I forwarding will be blocked at a type-I
unsafe node. Such a node u is the only node inside E(u).
For any unsafe node u, if a node w inside E(u) can be
reached in the type-I forwarding from u, w ∈ GF (u) and w is
type-I unsafe. Using w will cause a local minimum according
to Theorem 1.
Algorithm 3 shows the details of the construction process in
our safety model. In such a process, the safety status and the
estimated shape information are collected and distributed via
information exchanges among neighbors. Such an exchange is
implemented by broadcasting such information of a node that
newly changes its safety status to all its neighbors.
Algorithm 3 Information construction
1: Each healthy node is initially labeled as a safe node.
2: For each safe node, change one of its status to unsafe, say
N E, if there is no type-I safe neighbor within quadrant I.
3: For an unsafe node, say type-I unsafe node, set u(1) =
(1)
u(2) = u if N (u) ∩ Z(u) = φ. Otherwise, u(1) = v1
(2)
and u(2) = v2 , where v1 and v2 are the first and the last
type-I unsafe neighbors hit by a ray from u when scanning
the type-I request region in counter-clockwise order.
4: Repeat steps 2 and 3 until no safe node changes its status.
Theorem 3: For each unsafe area that only contains one hole,
Algorithm 3 converges within n2 rounds where n is the number
of boundary nodes [21] encircling it.
Proof: Assume that R is a rectangular region that exactly
covers the final stabilized unsafe nodes. Thus, we can find
every converging path whose length is shorter than half of the
perimeter of R. A converging path is a sequence of nodes
u1 → u2 → · · · → uk where ui (1 < i ≤ k) obtains its
unsafe status at round i. The number of rounds needed in a
converging process is the maximum length of the converging

path. Denote Lc , LR , and LH as the length of the converging
path, the length of the perimeter of region R, and the length
of perimeter of the only hole in R, respectively. Due to the
constitution of R in Algorithm 3, Lc < L2R and LR ≤ LH .
That is, Lc < L2H . Because length of any boundary is no less
than LH , the nodes along the converging path are no more
than half of the nodes along a boundary in probability; i.e.,
Algorithm 3 converges within n2 rounds.
As indicated in [21], the lower bound and the upper bound
of converging speed of boundary construction is n and 6 × n,
respectively. The above theorem shows that the construction
in our safety model converges much faster than the one in
boundary model in [21] in the networks without intertwined
holes; i.e., when each unsafe area contains only one hole. Their
converging speeds in the networks with intertwined holes are
compared in the experimental results in Section V.
We compare the boundary model [21] with our safety model
in terms of the cost of construction process as the follows:
1) A hole can be encircled by several boundaries initiated
by different stuck nodes, and many unnecessary nodes
are only included in a boundary to complete the circle.
It is proved in Theorem 1 that unsafe areas are optimal
for the LGF routing by considering the mutual impact
of holes in blocking the routing; that is, LGF routing
will cause a local minimum iff a node included in the
unsafe area is used. Due to different types of LGF
routing, there are four types of unsafe nodes and unsafe
areas. However, the number of unsafe nodes with any
of its four safety statuses unsafe is still less than that of
boundary nodes.
2) A boundary may be concave. The shape of the unsafe
area has been optimized to a rectangle in the local view
of each unsafe node. As a result, the construction process
under our safety model is easier and faster than the one
under the boundary model.
3) Each boundary node stores only the location of its downstream node. Compared with other models that require to
specify the border of a polygon, the boundary model has
the least storage requirement known to date. Each unsafe
node only stores the location of the opposite corner
of rectangle E(u). Therefore, the storage requirement
under the new information model is still kept minimal.
4) Building the boundary requires the identification of the
stuck node and the downstream node. These identification processes are complex. Under the safety model,
no calculation is needed. That is, the energy used for
computation can be conserved greatly.
IV. S AFETY-I NFORMATION -BASED LGF ROUTING
In this section, we apply the estimated shape information
and the safety status information to LGF routing. The new
routing is called safety-information-based LGF routing, or
simply, SLGF routing.
Basically, for a routing decision at the current node, the
safe neighbor within the request zone is always preferred.

d
Z(u)

d
d
v

u
safe node

u

routing
unsafe node
forwarding
(b)
(a)

detour
E(u) u
(c)

Fig. 4. Different routing cases in SLGF routing. (a) Forwarding with Z(u),
(b) forwarding when d ∈ an unsafe area, and (c) perimeter routing by “righthand rule”.

Whenever an unsafe neighbor exists, the unsafe area in neighborhood is detected. With the estimated shape information
stored in unsafe nodes, the routing will avoid entering an
affected hole area and achieve a more straightforward routing
path. When the destination is inside an unsafe area, the
corresponding estimated shape information will guide the
routing to route into that area. We also consider the routing
when the source is already inside an unsafe area. In that case,
the estimated shape information of the neighbors will help the
routing retreat from that unsafe area, and then, find a path to
the destination. In summary, the routing will use the estimated
shape information stored at the unsafe nodes to conduct the
routing phases in the following order: (1) forwarding to an
unsafe node when d is inside the corresponding unsafe area
(also called enforced forwarding), (2) forwarding to a safe
node within the request zone (also called safe forwarding),
(3) detouring to a safe node by “right-hand rule” (perimeter
routing), and (4) retreating from an unsafe area.
We will now explain how to use these phases in a typeI routing. From a type-I safe node, we can always find a
way to approach to the destination. Thus, any of its safe
neighbors in Z(u) can be a candidate of the successor node
in the greedy forwarding process (safe forwarding phase). A
sample is shown in Figure 4 (a). When the routing at u knows
at least one type-I unsafe node in neighborhood, including
u itself, say node w with the estimated shape information
E(w): [xw : xw(1) , yw : yw(2) ], the routing will first check
if d ∈ E(w). In that case, the routing has to approach to node
d among all the unsafe nodes (enforced forwarding phase).
The LGF routing that does not need safety information will
be applied to find a closer node in the area E(w) until the
destination is reached. A sample case is shown in Figure 4 (b).
When both above forwarding phases failed, the current node
cannot be a safe node to d. In such a case, the detouring phase,
and even retreating phase, will be conducted. First, rotate the
ray of u in a counter-clockwise direction. After the last unsafe
neighbor hit in Z(u), the first node v safe to d hit by the ray
(by the “right-hand rule”) will be selected as the successor
(perimeter routing phase). In other words, the successor node
v will be searched in quadrants II, III, and IV in that respective
order. Figure 4 (c) shows a sample of such a perimeter routing
in finding the path around the holes. When the routing starts
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from a source that is deep inside an unsafe area, the above
perimeter routing phase may also fail because there is no safe
neighbor around u. In such a case, the quickest way to leave
such an unsafe area is to route in the opposite direction to d
(retreating phase). For example, if the request zone is of typeI, the routing will go backwards to quadrant III. To ensure
the routing can always get out of the unsafe area, a node that
is not in the request zone will be selected as the successor
node v. Such a retreating phase will continue until the above
perimeter routing can be conducted successfully. The details
of our information-based routing are shown in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Safety-information-based routing (SLGF ) with
the assumption that xu ≤ xd and yu < yd (type-I)
At the current node u (including the source s):
1: If d ∈ N (u), forward the packet to d, and then stop.
2: Determine the routing type of each neighbor to d. Find an
unsafe node w ∈ (N (u) ∪ {u}) to d.
3: If d ∈ E(w), apply the enforced forwarding, i.e, use the
LGF routing to forward the packet to a node v ∈ E(w).
4: If such a w does not exist, apply the safe forwarding, i.e.,
forward the packet to any safe node v ∈ Z(u).
5: Otherwise, rotate the ray ud in counter-clockwise order to
find the first node v safe to d, and then, send the packet
to such a node v (i.e., the perimeter routing by the “righthand rule”).
6: If such a v is not found in step 5, apply the retreating,
i.e., send the packet to any neighbor v ∈ (N (u)\Z(u))
until the perimeter routing phase can be conducted.

V. E XPERIMENTAL R ESULTS
In this section, we study the average-case performance of
the proposed information model and routing algorithms, using
a simulator built in C++. The performance metrics used in the
evaluation are the rounds in converging and the nodes involved
in the hole identification process (i.e., cost of information
model), and the hops and length of routing path.
In the simulations, nodes with a transmission radius of 20
meters are deployed to cover an interest area of 200m × 200m,
under different deployment models. First, the nodes will be
deployed uniformly. This is ideal model (denoted by IA), in
which the hole is only caused by a sparse deployment. Usually,
the size of a hole is very small. Secondly, we randomly set
some forbidden areas inside interest area, where no nodes can
be deployed. The forbidden areas, which may be irregular, are
constructed to study the impact of larger holes on the proposed
algorithms. Such a model is denoted by F A. We assume that
the destination and the source are randomly selected in the
interest area, including both safe sources and unsafe sources.
Before we test the routing performance in routing time, within
the interest area, boundary information [21] is constructed
for GF routings, and safety information and estimated shape
information are constructed for our SLGF routing. Figure 5
shows a sample of the nodes involved in different information
construction processes. Then, we test the networks when the
number of nodes in the interest area is varied from 400 to 800
in increments of 50. For each case, 100 networks are randomly
generated, and the average routing performance over all of
these randomly sampled networks is reported.
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A. Cost of information model
Figure 6 shows the average number of rounds in converging
in different information constructions under both IA and F A
models. Safety information construction converges faster and
its implementation can be much easier. Thus, SLGF is much
more practical for supporting fast responses to routing requests
in WASNs. Because F A model has more large size holes, the
converging speed of each construction will be slowed down.
Figure 7 shows the average number of type-I unsafe nodes
involved in the information construction under both IA and
F A models. As we mentioned earlier in Section III, only a
node with newly updated safety status needs to broadcast the
information. Thus, such a number implies the number of 1-hop
broadcasting needed for type-I information construction. That
is, the results in Figure 7 also show the message complexity
of Algorithm 3. Type-II, III, and IV unsafe nodes have similar
results. A node having any of its four safety statuses unsafe
is called an “any type” unsafe node. The average number of
any-type-unsafe nodes is also shown in Figure 7. The results
show that fewer nodes are involved in the safety information
construction than that in boundary construction (denoted by
“boundary” in Figure 7), under IA model. As the node density
increases, the number of nodes involved will decrease due
to the smaller sizes of the holes. Obviously, when the size
of holes becomes larger, under either the IA model or the
F A model, more holes mutually impact each other and play
the blocking role together; That is, more nodes, especially
under the F A model, will be involved in safety information
construction while such a mutual relation cannot be described
in boundary nodes.
Figure 8 shows that the number of boundaries is always

larger than the number of unsafe areas identified. Therefore,
when new holes occur in the networks under either deployment
model, the information maintenance for boundaries is much
more difficult than that under our safety model.
B. Hops and length of routing
Figure 9 shows the upper bound of the number of hops
of routing path. Respectively, Figure 10 shows the average
number of hops of routing path. As we mentioned earlier in
Section II, when holes exist in the networks, LGF routing may
experience more perimeter routing phases than GF routing,
because its forwarding adaptivity is limited and it will experience more blocking cases that have no forwarding node to
use. As a result, LGF needs more hops. With the information
used under our safety model, the routing can predict the holes
ahead and avoid being blocked. In this way, SLGF routing
can keep the forwarding direction in many cases and require
the fewest number of hops in detour. It is because both GF
and LGF routings have no information of any hole ahead and
they can only route blindly. As shown in Figure 10, SLGF
routing reduces the number of hops of routing significantly by
approximately 25 percent as compared to GF, and about 35
percent as compared to LGF. When more large size holes occur
under FA model, the above property still holds. In WASNs, the
packet is forwarded hop by hop along the path. Reducing the
number of hops can reduce end-to-end delay and furthermore
support quick responses to routing requests. Figure 11 shows
the corresponding length of entire routing path on average.
These results prove the routing under our new information
model can always achieve shorter path and conserve more
energy used in data transmission. In Figure 10 and Figure 11,
the comparison of the routings from unsafe sources with the
ones from safe sources is provided. The results show that a
routing with unsafe source needs few hops to retreat from hole
area and can achieve nearly the same performance as it starts
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from a safe source. This proves the effectiveness of our safety
model as it does not disable any possible communication and,
indeed, improve the performance of them all. Figure 12 shows
the corresponding results of routings without mutual impact of
holes. Compared with the results in Figure 10 and Figure 11,
it illustrates the consistent improvement of our safety model.
We summarize observations from the experimental results
as follows. (1) The cost is reduced greatly under our safety
model, compared with that of the boundary model in [21],
in terms of the construction converging speed, the number
of nodes involved, and the complexity of maintenance. By
deploying more nodes or controlling the size of holes, the cost
of both models will be reduced. By taking advantage of the
broadcasting feature of wireless link, the message complexity
of our safety model can be controlled to a certain level. (2)
The proposed routing under safety model can always use fewer
hops and achieve shorter path. As a result, the proposed routing
has quicker response to routing request and conserve more
energy used in data transmission.
VI. R ELATED W ORK
In [22], some stuck nodes are identified as “dead ends”. By
removing the interference of holes, the detour in the perimeter
routing phase will be more efficient. In [23], a local protocol
produces short-cuts for the perimeter routing to bypass the
holes. However, both routings cannot avoid the occurrence of
every local minimum. In the approach presented in [24], the
forwarding is guaranteed in the hyperbolic plane. However,
whether every finite graph can be embedded in hyperbolic
space is still up to questioning.
Recent work has focused on the use of hole area that
contains the stuck nodes. In [21], the hole is detected at a node
where packet can get local minimum in greedy forwarding
routing [8], [9]. A process called BOUNDHOLE is initiated
to form a closed circle (also called the boundary). The region
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enclosed by the boundary will be identified as the hole area.
However, the identified hole area may not be convex. Without
enough shape information of the hole area, the routing may
not find a straight way to detour around the hole.
In [25], a stuck node contained in the convex hole area can
be identified as a “float” node when the angle between its
two adjacent neighbors exceeds a certain value (210◦ − 230◦ ,
suggested by the author). In [4], such an angle is called a
turning angle. A corner that is located beside the boundary of
a convex hole area is identified according to the values of its
turning angles. Furthermore, the convex hole area is identified
as the forbidden region via the corners. However, using the
threshold of the turning angle is not precise enough to avoid
every local minimum. In both approaches, even though many
nodes may successfully forward the packet to the destination,
they will be identified as stuck nodes and disabled from the
consideration of routing decision as well as their forwarding
paths. In many cases, the perimeter routing will be enforced
while the forwarding path still exists. Therefore, it is important
to minimize the shape of convex hole area so as to improve
the routing path.
Another issue ignored in the existing approaches on determining the convex area is that the shape of a convex area is
relative [26]; that is, its shape is different when the source
and the destination of routing change their relative locations.
In the existing schemes, the construction of convex hole areas
always needs to re-do for each different routing case and costs
a lot of time and energy.
VII. C ONCLUSION
This paper is the first attempt to find the balance of the
tradeoff between routing adaptivity and information model
cost while pursuing better routing performance in WASNs.
The paper is summarized as follows.

1) We optimize the shape of holes for LGF routing so
that the corresponding information model proposed in
this paper has an easy and quick construction, while its
storage requirement does not increase. Under such an
information model, the identified hole areas are optimal;
that is, the information-based LGF routing does not need
the perimeter routing detour whenever a forwarding path
exists.
2) The new information model proposed in this paper has
two uses: (a) the safe/unsafe status of a node is used to
prevent a routing from entering into the affected area of
a hole; (b) the estimated shape information E is used to
predict the hole and achieve a straightforward path.
3) The information-based routing proposed in this paper
mainly has three new parts: (a) route around the hole
intelligently in a safe forwarding phase; (b) route away
from the hole ahead (retreating phase); (c) route inside
the unsafe area if needed (enforced forwarding phase).
As a result, a more straightforward and shorter routing
path can be achieved.
4) Such an improvement of routing in the presence of
holes is the key to building a robust system in sparsely
deployed WASNs, which has gained more attention
recently. Moreover, the quickness of information construction makes our results more practical in networks
where topology changes frequently, such as in mobile
WASNs.
In our future work, we will extend our approach and search
for a new balance point to increase the routing adaptivity
so that fewer perimeter routing phases are needed and the
routing path will be more straightforward and shorter. Also,
we will conduct a further study on more accurate information
for unsafe areas so that shorter paths can be achieved.
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